Where Do Croatia’s Borders End?

Where Do Croatia’s Borders End?

A Response to “The Land Borders of Croatia: Between History, Law and Geodesy”

By Thomas D. Walls
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Free Republic of Liberland

The recent paper The Land Borders of Croatia: Between History, Law and Geodesy, by Ilija Grgić and Davor Kršulović, provides a useful overview of Croatia’s complex land borders. Published in Cartography and Geoinformation, the paper, written by authors affiliated with Zagreb University of Applied Sciences and Croatia’s State Geodetic Administration, contains valuable technical information about cadastral records, geodesy, GIS and the unresolved questions Croatia inherited from the breakup of Yugoslavia. 

Full text of the paper may be found here in English and Croatian: 
https://hrcak.srce.hr/en/347817

Unfortunately, when the authors turn briefly to Liberland, careful analysis gives way to unsupported assertion.

They write that the unresolved Croatia–Serbia border has produced “unilateral and legally unfounded attempts to proclaim new ‘states’ (e.g. the so-called Liberland), which have no basis in international law and do not affect the legal status of the dispute.”

Those are bold legal assertions. Yet the authors make no effort to demonstrate them. No principle of international law is cited. No case law is discussed. No analysis of the particular status of Gornja Siga is offered.

Liberland does not expect every Croatian official or scholar to agree with our legal position. But if an academic paper presents itself as an expert assessment grounded in international law, calling something “legally unfounded” is not enough.

Legally unfounded under what rule of international law, applied to what facts, and on whose territorial claim?

According to Croatian maps, Gornja Siga - Liberland - lies outside Croatia’s state borders. On this map, it lies behind the grayed-out area south of Himahat, east of the Monjoroš Canal and west of the Danube River. Source: Državna geodetska uprava / State Geodetic Administration Link

Look at the Map

This omission is particularly striking because the authors themselves emphasize the importance of geodesy and geographic information systems in resolving border disputes. They describe GIS as an important tool for evidence-based decision-making in territorial negotiations and delimitation.

We agree. So let us look at the maps.

The wider Croatia–Serbia border disagreement is well known. Croatia maintains that the international boundary should generally follow the cadastral boundaries existing between the former Yugoslav republics. Serbia maintains that the boundary generally follows the Danube.

Gornja Siga - the territory upon which Liberland was proclaimed on April 13, 2015 - presents an unusual consequence of these competing positions.

Under Croatia’s cadastral interpretation, Gornja Siga lies outside Croatia. Under Serbia’s river-based interpretation, it lies outside Serbia.

Liberland's interpretation agrees with both Croatia and Serbia, as far as Gornja Siga is concerned. We take no position on the areas that are actually in dispute between the two countries.

The creation and existence of Liberland is fundamentally different from a community simply declaring a new state on territory claimed by another sovereign country. Indeed, there is one remarkable point on which the otherwise incompatible Croatian and Serbian boundary theories converge: neither theory places Gornja Siga within the territory of the state advancing that theory. 

Croatia cannot insist that the cadastral boundary determines where Croatia ends while disregarding that same boundary when it places Gornja Siga outside Croatian territory.

The principle of uti possidetis juris does not make this anomaly disappear. Applied to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the principle generally supports the transformation of the former republics’ administrative boundaries into international frontiers in the absence of agreement to the contrary. Croatia relies heavily on this principle in defending the cadastral boundary against Serbia’s preference for the Danube.

But a legal principle must be followed wherever it leads. If Croatia maintains that the former inter-republican boundary determines the international frontier, it cannot simply disregard that boundary where its consequences are inconvenient.

Croatia cannot insist that the cadastral boundary determines where Croatia ends while disregarding that same boundary when it places Gornja Siga outside Croatian territory.

In the case of Gornja Siga, Croatia’s own cadastral interpretation places the territory on the other side of the boundary it claims. Uti possidetis juris therefore does not, by itself, establish Croatian sovereignty over Gornja Siga. If anything, Croatia’s reliance on the principle makes the territory’s unusual status a question requiring serious and fair legal treatment rather than summary dismissal. 

That circumstance is central to the Liberland case. Yet Grgić and Kršulović do not discuss it at all.

Gornja Siga was historically associated at different times with Austria-Hungary, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Serbia. But historical possession alone does not resolve contemporary sovereignty. Yugoslavia dissolved more than three decades ago, and the international boundaries of its successor states had to be determined from the legal and territorial circumstances resulting from that dissolution. 

It was not part of Eastern Slavonia, nor was it included within the territory administered by UNTAES (the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium) that was ultimately reintegrated into Croatia in the late 1990s. 

There is no self-evident reason that Gornja Siga must now become Croatian simply because it lies adjacent to Croatia. Nor does the existence of a broader unresolved border dispute give neighboring parties unlimited jurisdiction over every territory or community affected by the peculiar geography of the Danube.

The Complex Legacy of Croatia’s Borders

The authors’ own paper demonstrates why categorical statements should be made cautiously. Croatia still has unresolved or disputed border questions with several of its neighbors. These deserve to be presented as genuine disputes, with due weight given to the arguments of all sides. 

With Slovenia, years of negotiation led to international arbitration, followed by a serious procedural scandal. Croatia withdrew from the process and rejected the resulting 2017 arbitration award. Slovenia considers the award binding. Whatever one thinks of the merits, both sides have legal arguments that cannot simply be wished away.

The dispute with Serbia presents another set of problems because the Danube has changed course while older cadastral boundaries have not. The result is a patchwork of territories that the two states view differently.

And these are not merely theoretical questions for lawyers and cartographers.

Consider the Serbian villages of Neštin and Vizić. Although both are in Serbia and administratively belong to the municipality of Bačka Palanka, their geography means that residents normally travel through Croatia to reach their own municipal center. This requires crossing an international border twice. Recent difficulties associated with Schengen border procedures disrupted this everyday journey and required intervention and negotiations between Serbia and Croatia.

Borders have real consequences for real people. 

The actions of Croatian police and other state authorities toward our own community are likewise not insignificant, and they have been costly for everyone involved. More importantly, Croatia’s leadership overlooks the huge opportunity cost that comes from marginalizing the Gornja Siga community. We could be discussing enterprise zones, investment and cross-border development instead of expulsion orders and fines for camping on non-Croatian land. 
 

We could be discussing enterprise zones, investment and cross-border development instead of expulsion orders and fines for camping on non-Croatian land. 

The unusual geography inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Yugoslavia should therefore encourage careful analysis and a certain degree of humility. Cadastral boundaries, shifting rivers, historical administration, effective jurisdiction and international law do not always produce simple answers.

That is why dismissing Liberland in a sentence is inadequate.

Disagreement Is Welcome. So Is Serious Analysis.

Liberland does not claim that proclaiming a state automatically creates statehood. International law is more complicated than that. Questions of territory, population, government, relations with other states, recognition and administration all deserve serious examination. 

We have addressed those questions elsewhere and will continue to do so.

But that is very different from saying that Liberland has “no basis in international law.” Such a statement requires a substantive argument.

The unusual legal circumstances surrounding Gornja Siga existed before Liberland was proclaimed. Liberland did not create the contradictions between the Croatian and Serbian boundary positions. We noticed them and acted upon the consequences.

Croatia currently regulates land access to Gornja Siga, but this does not settle the underlying question of sovereign title. Restrictions imposed on river access also raise serious questions under the 1948 Belgrade Convention treaty regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube, which provides for free navigation and obliges Danube states not to obstruct or hinder navigation on the river’s navigable channels. 

Administration, territorial claims and sovereignty are related concepts, but they are not interchangeable.

Liberland welcomes serious debate about its legal position. We also welcome dialogue with Croatian scholars, geodetic experts, officials and institutions about the status and future of Gornja Siga. Croatia is our neighbor, and our community has every reason to seek a peaceful and constructive relationship based on mutual respect.

But serious disagreement requires serious arguments.

Calling Liberland “so-called,” “legally unfounded” or without a basis in international law does not answer the questions raised by Gornja Siga. It simply assumes a one-sided conclusion - one that needs to be demonstrated.

The maps deserve examination. So does the history. And if the authors maintain that Liberland is “legally unfounded,” we invite them to present the legal argument.